





























































On law, power and violence: from Achristoph 
Menke to Hannah Arendt. A critical analysis
Valerio Fabbrizi
This article wants to propose some reflections on 
law, power and violence in contemporary political 
philosophy. My attention will be devoted to a criti-
cal analysis of some relevant contribution on these 
matters by prominent scholars and authors such 
as Alessandro Ferrara, Christoph Menke, Walter 
Benjamin, Hannah Arendt. 
The first part is dedicated to a brief introduc-
tion in which the Alessandro Ferrara’s reading of 
Menke’s Law and Violence will be presented. The 
second part focuses its attention on the philosoph-
ical backgrounds of violence, especially in its rela-
tion to liberty, power and government. In this case, 
the main focus is devoted to some of the clas-
sics in political philosophy: Niccolò Machiavelli; 
Thomas Hobbes; Hannah Arendt. 
The last two paragraphs are finally dedicated 
to further reflections on law and violence. On the 
one hand, giving a deeper description of Ferrara’s 
remarks on Menke’s work, especially in its connec-
tion to Rawlsian political liberalism. The last para-
graph, on the other hand, proposes few brief and fi-
nal reflections on law and violence.



















































































[…] Faced with one who stands outside, and is alien to the law, the judgment 
of the judges can rule only by fear. That is why violence is part not just of the 
manifestation of the law but of its essence: the violence of the law flows from 
its political-procedural form of judgment.
Christoph Menke, Law and Violence
Between law and violence: a brief introduction
Violence – especially in its relationship with law and power – is one of the most 
debated issues in modern and contemporary political philosophical thought. 
Many authors and scholars have written and discussed on this relevant topic, 
giving their fundamental contribution and constantly renewing its philosophi-
cal grounds.
In a recent contribution entitled Deconstructing the Deconstruction of 
the Law: Reflections on Menke’s “Law and Violence”, Alessandro Ferrara gives us 
a new reading of one of the classics in contemporary philosophy – “Critique of 
Violence” by Walter Benjamin – through the interpretation given by Christoph 
Menke in his Law and Violence. In this short essay, Menke – as Ferrara underlines 
– highlights that the relationship between law and violence is, actually, much 
stronger and deeply grounded than we can imagine. 
Alessandro Ferrara assumes here three key points: the first focuses on 
this relationship between law and violence; the second moves its attention to the 
reinterpretation of Benjamin’s work given us by Menke; the third takes a much 
more peculiarly political-philosophical point of view, focusing on the relation-
ship between the political power as such and the legislation, with the latter whi-
ch seems to derive from the former.
Before moving to Alessandro Ferrara’s comment on Menke’s Law and 
Violence, in the next paragraph I shall present some reflections and considera-
tions on “law” and “violence” as these two concepts have been addressed and in-
terpreted in modern and contemporary political philosophy.
Law, violence and politics. a philosophical interpretation
In the beginning of the 16th Century, Niccolò Machiavelli – one of the most in-
fluential thinkers in the history of political thought – argued that violence was 
one of the ways in which the Prince could establish and hold his political pow-
er. According to Machiavelli, this “political use of violence” was connected to 
those regimes which he defined “per scelera” – namely those regimes obtained 
by means of “criminal virtues” or “violent actions”. 
However, Machiavelli distinguished between an “intelligent” and “lim-
ited” use of violence and an “indiscriminate” or “unjustified” one. As regards the 
first case – which sees in Agathocles of Syracuse a symbol figure – the Prince, as 
Machiavelli stressed, «[…] matched his iniquity with such great virtù of mind and 
body that, entering the army he rose through its ranks to become the military 
commander of Syracuse» (Machiavelli 2008, 179).
As regards the second case, Machiavelli identifies a particular figure 
of the Prince – exemplified by Oliverotto da Fermo – who resorts to an indis-
criminate and senseless violence, continuing in his crimes even after having ob-



















































































«it cannot be termed virtù to murder one’s fellow citizens, to betray friends, and 
to be without loyalty, mercy and religion; such method can cause one to win 
power, but not glory» (Machiavelli 2008, 181).
Machiavelli’s argument is still considerably relevant in the contem-
porary political-philosophical debate. This means that – in the light of the 
Machiavellian conception of politics – violence is “well used” just when it is the 
result of an immediate action, limited to the only seizure of power. After these 
“criminal actions”, in order to impose the obtained power, Machiavelli suggests 
that the Prince has to pacify the people, condemning and refusing any further vi-
olence. Parallel to this “well used” kind of political violence, Machiavelli identifies 
a “misused” kind of political violence: violence is “misused” when “criminal ac-
tions” continue constantly and incessantly over time, worsening and intensifying 
the “wounds” and the pains of people.
A further consideration about “law” concerns its relationship with 
“liberty” and its dichotomy between “positive” and “negative” conception of lib-
erty itself. 
A first suggestion is given us by Alessandro Ferrara. In his comment to 
Menke’s work, Ferrara (2016) underlines that:
Menke emphasizes that law bears not simply an instrumental relation with violence, in 
those unfortunate cases when persuasion, deterrence or all other means fail, but also a 
“structural”, permanent and ineliminable relation to violence […] Law does not discover 
an previously existent lawlessness, as though the state of nature really existed, but it 
creates areas of lawlessness to be violently subjected to lawful regulation. This is what 
Menke understands as “the fate of law” (2)
In this few lines, Ferrara uses the term “lawlessness” to mean – literally – a condi-
tion of “absence” or “silence” of the laws which clearly refers to a Hobbesian con-
ception of law and liberty. As we said, “law” turns out to be the key element in 
this dichotomy between a positive and a negative conception of liberty. This dif-
ferentiation between the two interpretations, theorized and outlined by Isaiah 
Berlin in his Two Concepts of Liberty, was clearly identifiable in two classical au-
thors such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau and, as we said, Thomas Hobbes. 
On the one hand, a negative concept of liberty is possible just in absence 
of laws (precisely, in a lawlessness condition), and it recalls the classical Hobbesian 
sentence according to which «we have liberty just when the law is silent». On the 
other hand, a positive concept of liberty – which has in Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
one of its main exponents – concerns the possibility to respect and obey the laws 
we – as citizens – contributed to create. From the same perspective, according 
to Menke, in a community of equal citizens, the presence of law involves the idea 
according to which we have no law outside such community. However, Ferrara 
notes that this idea proves to be false due to the expansion of international law 
and constitutional globalization, especially with regards to human rights.
A second argument to be proposed here is more directly related to 
the connection between “law” and “violence”; we can see this issue in Thomas 
Hobbes again. In the Leviathan, Hobbes theorized that «covenants, without the 
sword, are but words». This means that, according to him, violence represents 
the only way in which the law can be established and respected; at the same 
time, for Hobbes, the “sword” is fundamentally the only instrument to make the 



















































































A third consideration concerns the definition we give to the term “vio-
lence” in politics. On the one hand, we can face a purely “verbal” violence, which 
is often used during electoral campaigns in order to delegitimise the opponents 
and to show yourself stronger than them. 
A recent example can be found in Donald Trump’s USA presidential 
campaign. In his speeches – both during primary and presidential elections – 
the Republican candidate for the White House often resorted to language and 
expressions that many commentators did not hesitate to define as “political-
ly incorrect” or even, frequently, “violent”. At the same time, some others are 
convinced that his way of speaking and his “violent” conduction of the electoral 
campaign largely contributed to his final victory. 
Trump’s talking “outside the box”; his politically incorrect speeches; the 
arguments and proposals he made (like when, for example, he proposed to put 
Hillary Clinton in jail); the tones and gestures he used (let us remember when, 
during an electoral meeting, Trump said he could shoot someone in the middle of 
the road without losing even one vote) are the proof that the use of “verbal” vi-
olence has now entered the contemporary political speech, deeply marking the 
USA presidential elections.
A further reflection we can propose here concerns a more historical and 
philosophical interpretation of violence. In this case, Hannah Arendt helps us to 
understand how violence is one of the essential elements of any totalitarian re-
gime. We can mention here many examples of the use of violence as an instru-
ment for political fighting, in order to eliminate opponents or suppress any form 
of cultural and political opposition. Two examples are here paradigmatic: the 
first concerns the fascist violence in Italy during the late ‘20s and the early ‘30s 
of the 20th Century; the second one regards the violence committed by the SA, 
better known as “brown shirts” (or “camicie brune” in Italian), which preceded 
the seizure of power by the Nazi Party in post-Weimar Germany.
As Arendt shows, violence – distinct from the pure exercise of pow-
er, show of force and strength – is often accompanied by implements (Arendt 
1969) such as an historical context (e.g. a war or a revolution), new technologi-
cal knowledge and so on. On this line, the essence of violence is characterized by 
a “means-end category” which – applied to the political sphere – focuses on the 
idea that «the end is in danger of being overwhelmed by the means which it jus-
tifies and which are needed to reach it» (Arendt 1969, 4).
One of the points which Hannah Arendt noticed is that, for a consist-
ent group of political theorists, violence reveals itself as a peculiar manifestation 
of power. At the same time, power represents an instrument of rule, while – in 
turn – rule is essentially understood as an “instinct of domination” (Arendt 1969). 
However, in the political theoretical discourse, we cannot confuse terms such as 
“violence”, “power”, “force”, “coercion” and “authority”, because each of them af-
fects particular aspects of political sphere.
A rather sad reflection on the present state of political science that our terminology does 
not distinguish among such key words as “power”; “strength”; “force”; “authority” and, 
finally, “violence” – all of which refer to distinct, different, phenomena and would hardly 
exist unless they did […] To use them as synonyms not only indicates a certain deafness 
to linguistic meanings, which would be serious enough, but it has also resulted in a kind 



















































































Hannah Arendt argues that these terms seem to be synonyms because 
they try to give an answer to one the most relevant issues in political philoso-
phy: who rules whom? In this sense, Arendt shows how these terms – power; 
strength; force; authority and, finally, violence – indicate different but valid in-
struments through which someone rules over someone other. These terms seem 
to be synonyms essentially because they have the same function: to make the 
rule over men possible.
Its “instrumental” character is the peculiar aspect of violence in the 
political sphere and – as Arendt notes – it is apparently much more similar to 
strength rather than to force or power. But frequently, violence and power – or 
violence as manifestation of force – occur combined, rather than in their pure or 
extreme form.
From this it follows that authority, power and violence cannot be con-
sidered or understood as sides of the same coin. However, it is not so easy to im-
mediately perceive the differences between such issues and, in fact, some con-
fusion can always happen.
It is particularly tempting to think of power in terms of command and obedience, and 
hence to equate power with violence, in a discussion of what actually is one of power’s 
special case – namely the power of government. Since in foreign relations as well as do-
mestic affairs, violence appears as a last resort to keep the power structure intact against 
individual challenger […] it looks indeed as though violence were the prerequisite of 
power and power nothing but a façade, the velvet glove which either conceals the iron 
hand or will turn out to belong to a paper tiger (47)
The distinction between power and violence also relates to the two main con-
cepts of “justification” and “legitimacy”. On the one hand, power does not need 
justification due to its deep relevance in politics, but, on the other hand, power 
first of all needs legitimacy. Power belongs to people and draws its legitimacy 
from this democratic and popular sharing of sovereignty. 
In turn, Arendt specifies that violence can be justifiable, but never legit-
imated. Violence can be justified in private affairs when it concerns self-defence 
and when one’s own personal life or safety is in danger, but it cannot be legiti-
mated in politics as an instrument for political conflict. 
This explains why power and violence are intrinsically opposite: as 
Arendt underlines, «when the one rules absolutely, the other is absent» (56). So, 
violence rises when power is unstable and jeopardized, but when it takes its own 
course it ends in power’s disappearance. At the same time, Arendt notes that it 
is not possible to see in nonviolence the opposite of violence, because violence 
can easily destroy power, but it cannot create a new power, based – for instance 
– on nonviolent principles.
Violence is often aimed to emphasise protest movements and demands 
for change which power tends to ignore. This means that violence does not di-
rectly promote causes, nor revolution, nor any revolt; it is only an instrumental 
way to obtain attention and to bring such protest movements to public interest.
According to Sergio Cotta’s analysis, we face some different interpreta-
tions of violence in political theory: violence as war; violence as terrorism in any 
form; violence as political fighting; violence as “common crime”. Cotta focuses on 
two directions: on the one hand, he defines a so-called “pessimistic-comforting” 



















































































violence and past violence. Violence, in fact, is always inherent in human behav-
iour and it has marked the evolution of human civility throughout history. 
However, Cotta notes that today’s violence is peculiar for only two spe-
cific aspects: oblivion and illusion. Concerning the first one, Cotta argues that 
when, over time, we experience happiness and peace, we tend to forget violence 
in favour of the new peaceful conditions. Secondly, according to the “illusion” 
thesis, people seem to be convinced that political violence is no longer a real 
danger, but just an element from the past that we have to forget.
Cotta actually notes that, in the political sphere, violence is a con-
stant feature which occupies a big part of our social and political experience. 
Moreover, Cotta underlines that our current conception of violence does not 
imply to minimise or underestimate past violence and its presence in human 
history, but it asks us to recognize that violence turned itself from essential-
ly “physical” to a much more “verbal” kind of violence, which characterizes 
our contemporary political debates, as we have seen – for example – in the 
Trumpian case.
As Benjamin specified, an action becomes a violent action just when it 
affects moral relationships. The sphere and the context of such relationships are 
defined by the concepts of law and justice. So, Sergio Cotta remarks that if we act 
in order to defend a fundamental value (justice or liberty, for instance) our ac-
tion will be dominated by a just and fair principle. Otherwise, if our purpose is to 
act in an aggressive way and our actions are not intended to protect or promote 
a fundamental value, but just to show our force, such actions will be considered 
as mere acts of violence.
In Benjamin’s argument, some forms of social and political struggle – 
such as strikes or public protests – cannot be considered as manifestations of vi-
olence, but as a legitimated way to defend and enhance fundamental social rights 
and liberties. For Benjamin, indeed, we resort to violence, in its political sense, just 
as a form of domination and delegitimization of any opponent or critical voice.
In Why Violence: A Philosophical Interpretation Sergio Cotta (1965) 
wrote that:
In order to defend or propose a value, one may proceed in different ways. There is a pro-
found difference between petitioning and invading Parliament, even when both actions 
are motivated by the same value. Benjamin himself recognizes that, despite the criterion 
of reference to values, there is still the problem as to whether violence is moral in ge-
neral as a principle and also as a means to just ends. But to resolve this problem a more 
pertinent criterion is necessary, a distinction in the very sphere of the means, without 
concern for the ends to which they are necessary (58)
It emerges here that – in Cotta’s opinion – for Benjamin, “violence” and “law” are 
two incompatible elements. On the one hand, law is necessary to legitimise po-
litical power and to ensure the democratic character of our society. Violence, on 
the other hand, is frequently aimed to subvert democratic institutions, imposing 



















































































Law and violence in a liberal view: 
Alessandro Ferrara’s argument
One of the pivotal points in Alessandro Ferrara’s position concerns the limits with-
in which law is considered as just, fair and legitimated. As Christoph Menke points 
out, the presence of law within a community of free and equal citizens – in the 
words of John Rawls – implies that there is no law outside political society itself. 
Ferrara contests this view arguing that contemporary societies are 
characterized by a different kind of pluralism, much deeper than in the past; at 
the same time – according to Ferrara – we are facing a completely different polit-
ical and legal framework: in this sense, nowadays, we are no longer talking about 
law and constitution just in “national” or “domestic” terms, but, rather, in terms 
of “international” or “global” law. Democratic constitutionalism is now directed 
towards a new field of study which is more focused on a “global” dimension of 
constitutionalism.
Secondly, as Ferrara claims, Menke’s argument involves a further and 
wider reflexion on the relationship between law and violence within democratic 
liberalism. As we have seen above, one of the risks that democracy faces today is 
deeply related to the new upsurge of populism and alternative forms of political 
discourse, more and more tending to violence – first of all “verbal”. This tenden-
cy can be observed in today’s political debate, in which – as Benjamin predicted 
– we notice a continue delegitimization of critics and opponents. 
Menke assumes by Benjamin three key points, concerning the discus-
sion about law and violence: 1) The connection between maintenance of power 
and violence; 2) A so-called “realist” vision of politics which sees lawmaking pro-
ceeding from power; 3) An undefined and undifferentiated definition of power.
In discussing these three points, Alessandro Ferrara addresses some 
questions: as regards the first point, he asks why the maintenance of political 
and legal order should count as violence. At the same time, this also represents a 
controversial issue because it is not clear the reason why we should equate the 
defence of certain political and juridical practices – such as legislation, judiciary 
claims, judicial review, etc. – to violence. On this first point, Ferrara asks a col-
lateral question: does a moral culture, an ethos, commit violence when it tries to 
preserve its own integrity as a system of principles and values aimed at orient-
ing conduct? According to Ferrara, we cannot reduce law and violence in the ten-
dency of law to maintain and protect itself against global social changes which 
affects the contemporary society.
Concerning the second point, Ferrara notes that Menke does not seem 
to share the Benjamin’s thesis for which «lawmaking is power making and, to 
that extent, an immediate manifestation of violence» (Benjamin 1978, 295). This 
“realist view” of politics was deeply immersed within the political context of the 
aftermath of World War I, in which democracy was not strong enough to be a 
real political horizon for Western people. Our attention here undoubtedly goes 
to Carl Schmitt, who conceived sovereignty and legitimacy as the power to sus-
pend the rule of law declaring the so-called “state of exception” (Schmitt 1932).
In Benjamin’s idea, there is the attempt to separate law from violence, 
proposing the concept of divine justice or mystical violence, «from what» - 
Ferrara stresses - «he perceives as law’s compulsive repetition of the initial vio-
lence and yet to be forced to think of such liberation in terms of categories par-



















































































Finally, the third point concerns the relationship between law and vi-
olence especially in its connection to the concept of power. The critical point in-
volves here Menke’s undifferentiated conception of power, in which there is no 
distinction between “legitimate” power and the power as “use of force”. As Ferrara 
remarks, the legitimate use of power by means of law can never be confused with 
the exercise of violence or illegitimate act of coercion, simply because «the orig-
inary founding of a legal system requires a moment of belief or […] a moment of 
recognition that naked power cannot impose» (12).
The nexus between law, violence and liberalism appears to be – in 
Menke’s analysis – particularly relevant and directed to two main consequences. 
Firstly, within liberalism, individuals are free from the coercion and they become 
part of the legal and political order as free and equal, to pursue their own pri-
vate and economic interest, facing which they are “hostages”. Secondly – quot-
ing Menke – «liberalism leaves what it separates intact» (Menke 2010, 47). It 
means to insulate certain areas of the human being from the so-called “law’s em-
pire” (Dworkin 1986), without questioning or changing it.
To move to contemporary issues, the recent “escalation” of violence, 
aggressiveness and animosity in politics carries the risk of leaving us a weaker 
and unstable democracy. In his famous article entitled How Can the People Ever 
Make the Laws? A Critique of Deliberative Democracy, Frank Michelman identi-
fied a list of particular conditions which could weaken and potentially under-
mine democracy in its own grounds. These inhospitable conditions for democ-
racy include, for instance: a) The growing extension of the electorate – which 
seems to make our personal vote irrelevant; b) The complexity of our institution-
al systems which characterizes our contemporary society and makes it difficult 
to understand the functioning of our institutions; at the same time, this complex-
ity seems to contribute in convincing citizens to move away from politics aban-
doning political participation; c) The vast and deep pluralism – political and cul-
tural, first of all – which is now irreducible and renders our democratic consensus 
on fundamental values more unstable, due to a corresponding push towards the 
public hegemony of the majoritarian culture.
Ferrara, in his most recent book entitled The Democratic Horizon. 
Hyperpluralism and the Renewal of Political Liberalism, indicates a new condition 
of plural society which he calls hyperpluralism. Ferrara addresses his attention in 
the sense of expanding and renewing the classical paradigm of reasonable plu-
ralism in Rawlsian political liberalism. The last inhospitable condition he identi-
fies in this new democratic horizon is d) the so-called “depersonalization” of pol-
itics, which contributes to the substantially anonymous process of political will 
formation increasingly related to the new social media and the consequent im-
personal political relationships.
Ferrara, assuming this classical classification of inhospitable conditions 
from Michelman, adds some other possible conditions which could potential-
ly contribute to make a weaker or unstable democracy: 1) the new hegemonic 
role played by neo-liberal capitalism and the prevailing of financial markets with-
in contemporary capitalist economy; 2) the extreme acceleration of our society, 
which reduces the time we devote to political engagement, limiting our participa-
tion in the political debate; 3) the transition from the classical public sphere em-
bodied by the traditional media, to a new social sphere controlled be new media.
To this long list of inhospitable conditions, we can add one more con-



















































































increasing migrations and growing cultural diversity: a progressive shift to-
wards new (or old) forms of populist democracy, which assume verbal violence 
as a tool of political competition, appealing to fear and insecurity to justify po-
litical decisions.
Another point discussed by Ferrara concerns the relationship between 
“law” within “legitimate forms of government” and the dichotomy between nor-
mative and realist conception of politics. In this sense, according to a normative 
approach – especially in its Rawlsian definition – the exercise of power is fully 
proper and legitimated just when it is exercised «in accordance with a constitu-
tion, the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be ex-
pected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their com-
mon human reason» (Rawls 1993, 137).
On the contrary, a more realist interpretation of politics – as expressed, 
for example, by an author such as Richard Bellamy – defends the idea according 
to which the legitimate exercise of power and the legitimacy of laws – and of the 
constitution itself – are just related to the will of a majority as expressed in the 
last electoral turn or in a legislative and parliamentary vote.
Law, violence and society. Few final remarks
In this last section of the article, I want to propose some brief final reflections on 
law and violence in the political context. First of all, creating law involves two 
different aspects: on the one hand, creating law it’s the way to give legitimacy 
and justification to political order – in this sense, our scheme of government is 
legitimated and justified when it is “always under law” (Michelman 1995); on the 
other hand, creating law is a way to create “political power”, which is aimed – at 
the same time – to preserve and reinforce itself, resorting to violence against op-
ponents especially when political power expresses itself in authoritarian ways. 
Following Benjamin’s analysis, we can distinguish two basic arguments 
on law and violence. The first assumes violence as a means used by political pow-
er to pursuit its ends; it fails – in Ferrara’s words – because it would focus merely 
on the law-preserving function of violence (Ferrara 2016). 
The second argument investigates the deep connection between law-
making and violence, identifying two main functions of violence in the lawmak-
ing process: firstly, as Benjamin notes, «lawmaking pursues as its end, with vi-
olence as its means, what is to be established as law» (Benjamin 1978, 295). 
Secondly, this end is not unalloyed by violence, but – actually – it is deeply and 
structurally bound with it, assuming the name of power. These two arguments 
are addressed by Benjamin and summarized in a general final consideration: 
«lawmaking is power making, and, to that extent, an immediate manifestation of 
violence» (Benjamin 1978, 295). 
On this line, Menke clarifies that, according to Benjamin, the violence 
of law is equivalent to the fact that the use of violence by political power is just 
aimed to protect and preserve itself. As he clearly notes «the law is purely about 
power, yet not about the power of the ruling class or the victor; it is about its 
own power, the power of the law. The “fateful” violence of the law is the violence 
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